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Abstract—NFC mobile phones can communicate with other
phones, devices, or RFID tags. Those tags are often embedded
into smart posters that offer the ability to exchange small files,
photos and contact details. The Nokia 6212 Classic is currently the
most popular NFC phone. It allows users to easily exchange digital
objects using the NFC interface. To do so, two phones should be
within the proximity coupling distance of 5 cm. This paper shows
the NFC feature that invokes a Bluetooth connection without user
consent can be abused to surreptitiously install malicious software
on an NFC phone. This results in a serious vulnerability, when, for
instance “smart posters” start acting “smarter”, install malicious
applications and start spreading viruses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is an
extension of several Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID)
proximity communication standards [9], [10], [13]. It basically
combines the RFID standards and describes them with some
additional features in two new standards [11], [12]. The two
main new features added in the standards are peer-to-peer
connections between two active NFC devices (NFCIP) and
the emulation of a passive proximity RFID tag. The NFC
technology mainly focus on contact-less smartcards that operate
at a frequency of 13.56 MHz.
With the introduction of several pervasive devices, NFC is
one of most promising techniques for connecting two devices
at proximity range. A commercial example are the Smart
Posters [20] which contain an embedded NFC tag. Such a
poster provides interesting information to active NFC devices
that are in proximity range of the embedded NFC tag. It is
very user-friendly to provide digitalized information without
extensive user interaction. However this has a major drawback
from a security point of view, since the user has less control
over the automatically triggered events. Although NFC is a
promising technique, it is designed for small and lightweight
transactions. For larger objects, distance and transfer rates the
widely deployed Bluetooth protocol [2] is more applicable.
Content sharing and NFC Bluetooth pairing are features of
the Nokia 6212 phone that combine both techniques. Content
sharing provides a way to quickly share a contact, note, file or
other object from one phone to another. NFC Bluetooth pairing
makes it easy for users to let their phone pair with a Bluetooth
NFC-enabled device like a headset.
A. Related work
There are two known attacks [16], [23] that use malicious
code-injection worms on RFID and NFC systems. They both
make use of a maliciously prepared passive tag that is read by
the system and causes a buffer-overflow or SQL-injection. These
attacks are limited, since the user has to initiate a transaction
to read out the tag and parse the data stored on it. Although
this limits the probability of a successful attack scenario, NFC
is often used in the context where it invites users to touch a
tag followed by an confirmation to execute a proposed action.
The protocols and techniques that are Nokia proprietary and
kept secret to provide security-through-obscurity. There are
numerous examples in the literature [6]–[8], [24], [25] showing
that once the secrecy of an protocol or cipher is lost, so is its
security.
B. Our contribution
This paper analyzes the security vulnerabilities of the NFC
features embedded into mobile phones. It demonstrates practical
attacks on the latest firmware of the latest Nokia phone that has
extensive NFC capabilities, the Nokia 6212 Classic. The attacks
focus on Nokia’s proposed proprietary “content sharing” and
“NFC Bluetooth pairing” capabilities of the phone.
First, this paper shows the NFC communication protocol
between the Nokia NFC phone and an NFC tag [21]. This
message can be slightly modified and send using any NFC
device in passive tag emulator mode. This could trick a user
that tries to read a passive NDEF tag into communicating
with a malicious NDEF tag emulator. Secondly we analyze
the communication between two Nokia NFC phones when one
phone tries to send an object to the other. We demonstrate the
ability to impersonate a regular NFC device as an initiating
(or target) phone. By modifying and sending a recorded NFC
communication, we can activate an incoming Bluetooth channel
on the target phone.
After tricking the user into touching the malicious NDEF
tag and invoking the Bluetooth channel we demonstrate that
it is possible to install applications on the phone without user
consent. Finally we show that it is possible to escalate the appli-
cation privileges and register the application in the manufacturer
or operator domain of the Nokia 6212 phone. Applications
running in these domains have unlimited access within the
Java Mobile Edition Application Programmers Interface (Java
ME API). They do not require any user interaction during the
execution of restricted operation as defined in the Java ME
developers manual [14]. In principle it would be possible to
use these vulnerabilities to create a worm that spreads itself
by touching other NFC phones. The NFC device used for
demonstration contains comparable hardware that is embedded
into the Nokia 6212 phone.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces
NFC techniques and protocol details. Section III provides more
information about the NDEF specification and appliances can be
found. The usability and differences of an NFC and Bluetooth
connection and their relevance to the practical attacks are
described in section IV. Details about the content sharing feature
of the Nokia 6212 NFC phone is described in section V.
Section VI presents eavesdropped traces which were made
during a content sharing transmission. Section VII introduces
and explains the layout of an NDEF Bluetooth Pairing tag.
Section VIII shows the practical attacks that were executed on
an NFC phone when it came in proximity of a regular NFC
reader. In the last section we evaluate the impact of our attacks
and a few possible countermeasures that could be taken into
account to prevent the described attack scenarios.
II. NFC TECHNIQUES AND PROTOCOL
One of the main new features of NFC is the emulation of
passive tags (target in NFC terminology). Emulation means
here that an NFC device acts like a passive target and does
not generate a radio frequency (RF) field. It communicates like
a original passive tag to the RFID reader (initiator in NFC
terminology). This makes the technology backwards compatible
with already deployed RFID proximity readers. Passive NFC
tags are often used for the storing small messages, trigger an
application event or to redirect a user to online content. The
technique used for this is called NFC Data Exchange Format
(NDEF) and is thoroughly explained in the next section.
NFCIP is a special operation mode of NFC, which is defined
in the ISO/IEC 18092 standard [11]. It provides a peer-to-
peer communication channel between initiator and target. In
passive mode, only the initiator is responsible for generating
the RF field. In active mode both the initiator and target need
to generate their own RF field and activate it intermittently.
NFCIP works in master-slave mode, where the initiator starts
with sending some data to which the target has to respond.
Situation 1 in Figure 1 shows the class reader/tag relationship
where situation 2 shows the NFCIP situation.
Fig. 1: NFCIP Communication
For our research we are using the NFC device from Advanced
Card Systems (ACS)1. This reader contains a chip that is
manufactured by NXP Semiconductors, one of the founders
of NFC Forum2. The NFC controller chip [22] from NXP
supports most of the extensive NFC features and is backwards
compatible with several proprietary RFID protocols using the
same frequency. To use all the features of these PN53x chips, it
requires to use a low level command interface to the chip. For
1ACS ACR122, firmware ACR122U102, http://nfc-reader.com
2http://www.nfc-forum.org
this we used the publicly available open-source library libnfc3.
With this library it is possible to execute all low-level commands
required to invoke the presented attacks.
III. NFC DATA EXCHANGE FORMAT
NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) format standardizes
how to store data on a smartcard that is compatible with one
of the NFC Forum tags. These tags can be used to store for
example bookmarks, business cards, alarm clock settings, Smart
Posters information, Call or SMS Requests and several other
objects. The following NDEF message represents a Smart Poster
that links to the libnfc project website. When it gets touched by
an NFC phone, the user is asked to open the browser and visit
http://libnfc.org.
0321D1021C537091 01095402656E4C69 |.!...Sp...T.enLi|
626E666351010B55 036C69626E66632E |bnfcQ..U.libnfc.|
6F7267FE00000000 0000000000000000 |org.............|
The NDEF specifications [17] to decode this binary data set
are publicly available on the NFC Forum website. The NDEF
headers in this example use as Type Name Formats (TNF)
the value 0x01, which represents a “NFC Forum Well-known
Type”. These well-known types are defined in the Technical
Specification [17] from the NFC Forum.
0321 NDEF message TLV, Value length = 0x21
D1 NDEF header, ME=1, MB=1, SR=1, TNF=0x01
02 Record type length = 0x02
1C Payload length = 0x1C
5370 Record type = "Sp" (Smart poster)
91 NDEF header, MB=1, SR=1, TNF=0x01
01 Record type length = 0x01
09 Payload length = 0x09
54 Record type = "T" (Text)
02 UTF-8, two-byte ISO language code
656E Language code = "en" (English)
4C69626E6663 Payload = "Libnfc"
51 NDEF header, ME=1, SR=1, TNF=0x01
01 Record type length = 0x01
0B Payload length = 0x0B
54 Record type = "U" (URI)
03 URI Identifier code, prefix = "http://"
6C69626E66632E6F7267FE Payload = "libnfc.org"
FE TLV Terminator
This example shows that an NDEF message can contain
multiple records of various types. A link to online content will
most likely invoke a visit to the website. It is the responsibility
of the NFC device that is processing the message to decide
if there has to be any user interaction. When a combination
of different record types are used it is unclear which action
is presented to the user to accept. For most record types the
Nokia 6212 NFC phone implemented this interaction by default.
However, the NDEF attack shows that this interaction is clearly
not specific enough for a user to assess all the risks that are
involved.
IV. NFC AND BLUETOOTH
The most common way to transmit an object from one phone
to another is by sending it over a Bluetooth connection. When
more phones supporting NFC technology this could change,
but one should take into account that there are three major
differences between NFC and Bluetooth, namely the transfer
3http://www.libnfc.org
rate, communication distance and initialization speed. The data
transfer rate of NFC is substantially lower than a Bluetooth
connection. This makes it more convenient to use Bluetooth for
transferring bigger objects. This difference is not noticeable for
smaller objects like contacts, text messages and business cards.
The communication distance for two NFC devices is of about 5
centimeters, where a Bluetooth connection can take place over
a distance of several meters. It can be inconvenient to keep two
phones in proximity range of each other during the transfer of
a big object. For smaller objects, the transfer finishes by merely
a touch of one second, this has considerably less influence on
the usability. The initialization phase of an NFC connection
is finished in less than 10ms. This is considerable less than
the several seconds a Bluetooth connection requires before it is
ready. Advanced Bluetooth services only work after a successful
pairing process. During this process the parties involved need
to actively advertise and discover each other Bluetooth Media
Access Control (MAC) address, followed by the entering of a
mutually agreed PIN code. In contrast, the NFC initialization is
handled automatically and does not require any user interaction.
The data that is required for a Bluetooth pairing is rather
small, it only needs the MAC address and the PIN code. These
two data fields can be combined in one NDEF message and
transmitted using an NFC communication. This brings together
the fast initialization between two NFC devices combined with
the bigger range and speed of a Bluetooth connection.
V. CONTENT SHARING
The Content Sharing feature can be invoked by browsing to a
passive object on the phone. The object is passive when it only
represents a dataset and does not contain any executable code.
Select for instance a picture taken with the built-in camera,
choose the “Share” option in the “Options” menu or use the
NFC menu by choosing the “Share to device” option. This will
make the phone search for another NFC capable device in its
proximity and starts sending this object to the other device.
Content Sharing proceeds by establishing an NFCIP connec-
tion to share the actual data, or by enabling Bluetooth when the
shared content exceeds a certain size limit. A simple “Business
card”, “Call request” or “Note” is transferred using the NFC
communication. Bigger objects like a “Gallery item” containing
a picture, or a larger “Note”, is transferred over Bluetooth.
Content Sharing support is enabled by default and makes it
more convenient for the initiator to share passive objects. For
the target side, this is more troubling, it receives any incoming
object without prior confirmation. Even when the option “by
confirmation” is selected, the phone only notifies the user after
completing the incoming transmission.
The Nokia 6212 “NFC Settings” allowed configurations:
Setting Options (default = bold)
NFC (on / off)
Content sharing (quick / by confirmation / not available)
Content Sharing automatically enables Bluetooth on both the
initiating and target phone if this was not active before. It does
not matter if the phone has disabled the Bluetooth functionality,
the phone is practically forced to enable it. Bluetooth devices
usually have to be paired in order for any exchange of data
to take place. An exception to this is the OBject EXchange
(OBEX) service which can accept transfers directly. The au-
thorization for sending a file is put at the application layer.
When Content Sharing is initiated, the phone tries to find an
NFCIP target in proximity range. After setting up the NFC
connection the initiator triggers an OBEX configuration change
on the target phone that allows data transfers from the Bluetooth
device with the MAC address that belongs to the initiator.
Only passive objects can be shared from the phone. Sharing
installed applications is not allowed and invokes the following
error message: “This file is copyright protected”. Even when
it concerns a self-written application for which it was never
specified that it should be “copyright protected”.
VI. NFCIP DATA ANALYSIS
We captured the data exchanged between two NFC phones
using two NFC reader devices. For logging and relaying the
NFC communication between the two Nokia phones we pub-
lished the nfcip-relay tool4. The high level overview of this
setup is shown in Figure 2. NFC communication is compatible
with the ISO/IEC 14443 Type A Proximity RFID standard [10].
Therefor we could verify the captured data at a network frame
level using the Proxmark5 RFID analyzer. To capture the frames
we used the modified firmware written by Gerhard de Koning
Gans [4], [5]. The data is wrapped in several network layers, for
readability we focus on the captured data that was transferred on
application level between the two NFCIP devices. This makes it
easier to extract the actual commands we have to imitate later,
when mimicking a phone.
Fig. 2: NFCIP Relay Design
NFC Reader I is activated by the initiating phone, which
means that the reader was placed in target mode. NFC Reader
II activates the target phone, which means the reader is set to
initiator mode. For the relay to work it should activate the target
phone with the same parameters that were used by the phone
to activate NFC Reader I. These exact parameters were used
to activate the target phone with NFC Reader II. After this
initialization the actual data is relayed between NFC Reader
I and NFC Reader II.
1 I->T: 1620 |. |
T->I: 1630 |.0|
2 I->T: c285 |..|
T->I: 8285 |..|
3 I->T: 15e00091020a4872 10d1020461630101 |......Hr....ac..|
31005c0d0d016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\...nokia.com:|
7368653101c00a49 6e69746961746f72 |she1...Initiator|
00 |.|
T->I: 15f00091020a4872 10d1020461630101 |......Hr....ac..|
31005c0d0a016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\...nokia.com:|
7368653101400754 617267657400 |she1.@.Target.|
4 I->T: c18501 |...|
4http://nfcip-java.googlecode.com
5http://www.proxmark.org
T->I: 818501 |...|
5 I->T: c1c51091020a4873 10d1020461630101 |......Hs....ac..|
31005c0d0d016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\...nokia.com:|
7368653101c00a49 6e69746961746f72 |she1...Initiator|
00 |.|
T->I: 81c51091020a4873 10d1020461630101 |......Hs....ac..|
31005c0d0a016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\...nokia.com:|
7368653101400754 617267657400 |she1.@.Target.|
6 I->T: 15a001 |...|
T->I: 15b001 |...|
7 I->T: 15e011d20c787465 78742f782d764361 |.....xtext/x-vCa|
7264424547494e3a 56434152440d0a56 |rdBEGIN:VCARD..V|
455253494f4e3a32 2e310d0a4e3b4348 |ERSION:2.1..N;CH|
41525345543d5554 462d383b454e434f |ARSET=UTF-8;ENCO|
44494e473d384249 543a446f653b4a6f |DING=8BIT:Doe;Jo|
686e0d0a54454c3b 505245463b564f49 |hn..TEL;PREF;VOI|
43453b454e434f44 494e473d38424954 |CE;ENCODING=8BIT|
3a2b333132343132 33343536370d0a45 |:+31241234567..E|
4e443a5643415244 0d0a |ND:VCARD..|
T->I: 818502 |...|
8 I->T: 0040 |.@|
T->I: 0040 |.@|
This communication trace shows a recording of the NF-
CIP transmission when sharing an electronic business card.
Messages 3 and 5 seem to be almost identical, it is unclear
why Nokia uses this redundancy in their NFCIP transmission.
Message 7 contains the actual content of the business card that
appears to be encoded as a vCard6. An NFCIP replay with a
regular NFC device of the initiator part would immediately work
and result in the vCard being delivered to the target. When for
instance a note is sent from the initiator to the target which
exceeds the maximum length of a message, NFCIP chaining is
used to send all the data. This means that the initiator sends
a message where the first byte indicates (target specifier) that
more data is coming after this message. The target responds
with an empty message until all data from the initiator was
received. In our case the data was split in blocks of maximum
size of 236 bytes. Furthermore, we observed that all messages
before message 7 are identical for both sending a note, vCard
or image. Below we show messages from 7 onward where it
activates the Bluetooth connection.
7 I->T: 15e01191020a4872 10d1020461630101 |......Hr....ac..|
31005c0c25016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\.%.nokia.com:|
6274310000226566 eb815a0204000000 |bt1.."ef..Z.....|
0000000000000000 00000000000a496e |..............In|
69746961746f7200 |itiator.|
T->I: 818502 |...|
8 I->T: 0040 |.@|
T->I: 81c52191020a4873 10d1020461630101 |..!...Hs....ac..|
31005c0c22016e6f 6b69612e636f6d3a |1.\.".nokia.com:|
6274310000226566 eea65a0204000000 |bt1.."ef..Z.....|
0000000000000000 0000000000075461 |..............Ta|
7267657400 |rget.|
9 I->T: 15a002 |...|
T->I: 0040 |.@|
Messages 7 and 8 are again similar to messages 3 and 5,
but now a Bluetooth address is encoded in the message body.
For the initiator this is 00226566eb81 and for the target it is
00226566eea6. Again, every protocol run results in exactly
the same data for every message. Replaying the above initiator
messages results in an activation of Bluetooth on the target
phone and acceptance of file transfers from the specified Blue-
tooth MAC address in message 7. We tried all configurations
for the “Content sharing” option in the “NFC Settings” menu,
but there was never a notification or confirmation reported back
to the user during the Bluetooth activation process.
6http://www.w3.org/TR/vcard-rdf/
The phone uses the OBject EXchange (OBEX) protocol to
exchange data over Bluetooth. OBEX is a protocol to efficiently
transfer binary objects between devices. Running the protocol as
before, which triggers the activation of Bluetooth, allows a data
transfer using the OBEX protocol from the address specified in
message 7. By using a phone as initiator to share a file to a
PC that has an NFC reader attached we modify the Bluetooth
hardware address of the target in the response message 7 to
the hardware address of the PC’s Bluetooth device. The tool
hcidump7 captures the Bluetooth data received at the PC. We
observed that the phone tried to send a file using OBEX push.
After configuring our PC to accept OBEX Push transfers from
any device we were able to receive the file from the phone.
We then turned this around and tried to send to the phone a
file using OBEX push, which also worked flawlessly without
requesting any user confirmation on the phone.
From a phone it is not possible to send applications (MIDlet
suites) to another phone, this is possible from a PC as any
file transfer is allowed when the correct Bluetooth hardware
address was sent to the target in message 7. We observed that
after pushing an application to the phone, it automatically gets
installed and bookmarked in the phone menu. A possible threat
is that this way it is possible to install an application on the
phone which has some push registry entries activated that can
launch the application on certain external events like a timer
or by presenting a certain NFC tag in proximity distance of
the phone. By default the permissions of the application do not
allow any operation that may cause the user (financial) damage.
The application won’t be able to access the network or personal
data without user acceptance.
VII. NDEF AND AUTOMATIC PAIRING
This section shows the use of NDEF messages [17]. The
messages related to “Connection Handover” [19] are here of
interest as they specify the use of Out of band (OOB) mecha-
nisms to establish Bluetooth pairings. In particular appendix B.2
“Handover to a Bluetooth Carrier”. This feature is provided with
products like the Nokia Bluetooth BH-505 or BH-2108 headset.
Fig. 3: NFC OOB Bluetooth Pairing
The product comes with a pairing tag that enables NFC
phones to configure a paired bluetooth connection channel for
diverse audio purposes. It simply requires a user to bring the
NFC phone in proximity distance of the tag that is embedded
into the headset. The phone shows a “connect to” confirmation
before it connects to the headset. For our example we created an
NDEF pairing tag with a “1234” PIN code, with the Bluetooth
address 00:11:22:33:44:55 and “Poster” as description.
Looking closer to the content of an NDEF tag we will find the
following data.
0330D40C216E6F6B 69612E636F6D3A62 |.0..!nokia.com:b|
7http://www.bluez.org/
8http://europe.nokia.com/bh-210
0324 NDEF message TLV, Value length = 0x24
D4 NDEF header, ME=1, MB=1, SR=1, TNF=0x04
0C Record type (RT) length = 0x0C
15 Payload length = 0x15
6E6F6B69612E636F6D3A6274 RT = "nokia.com:bt"
00 Configuration = 0x01 (PIN)
001122334455 Bluetooth MAC = "00:11:22:33:44:55"
Bluetooth Class of Device (CoD)
20 Major Service Class = Audio
04 Major Device Class = Audio/Video
18 Minor Device Class = Headphones
31323334 PIN Code = "1234"
000000000000000000000000 PIN Code Padding
06 Length of name = 0x06
506F73746572 Name = "Poster"
FE TLV Terminator
Fig. 4: NDEF pairing tag
7400001122334455 2004183132333400 |t..."3DU ..1234.|
0000000000000000 00000006506F7374 |............Post|
6572FE |er.|
This pairing tag uses a proprietary NDEF definition. This is
recognizable by looking at the specified TNF value, which has in
this case the value 0x04 that represents an NFC Forum external
type defined in the Record Type Definition document [18].
Looking at the NDEF message in detail it shows a Record type
of “nokia.com:bt”. This is a proprietary Bluetooth Pairing tag
that is defined by Nokia. This tag was introduced at the release
of the first public Nokia 6131 NFC phone, but is compatible
and supported by current generation Nokia NFC phones.
After confirmation the phone automatically starts pairing
using the supplied Bluetooth MAC Address and PIN Code. This
even happens when the Bluetooth connection is disabled. The
phone enables it without explicitly notifying the user of this
activation. When the pairing succeeded it starts connecting to
the headset interface available in the Bluetooth protocol stack
of the headset.
It is possible to replace the Bluetooth MAC Address with an
address that belongs to a PC. The phone pairs successfully but
can not connect to the headphone interface. It will deactivate
Bluetooth immediately after an unsuccessful headset setup. It
is interesting to see that the pairing between the two addresses
is stored in the phone as a successful and trusted channel, even
when it failed to connect to the headset.
The Bluetooth specification [2] mentions an OOB mechanism
as part of “Simple Pairing”. The detailed white paper about
simple pairing [1] focuses more on the security and less on
the actual implementation details. The paper mentions that the
OOB mechanism either uses one-way or two-way authentication
where cryptographic information can be exchanged using the
NFC communication channel. Figure 4 shows that the advanced
cryptographic features of the OOB mechanism supports are not
required.
VIII. ATTACKING A CELL PHONE
This section describes three attacks, one that uses Content
Sharing, the other a NDEF pairing tag and a the last one a
combination of both. The properties of these attacks are shown
in figure 5.
Using the content sharing feature it is possible to upload a
malicious application to the cell phone without any user consent.
By sending a modified NFCIP communication trace of the
content sharing feature, it is possible to activate Bluetooth on
the target phone. An attacker could force this upon a victim just
by standing next to him and holding the attacking NFC device in
proximity range of his phone. This invokes the content sharing
feature between NFC device, malicious PC and the phone. We
use an OBEX transfer to upload a malicious application (MIDlet
suite) to the mobile phone. The victim does not have to interact
with his phone to accept any incoming connection, which makes
this attack very practical. It could be performed just by holding
the attacking NFC device next to the victims pocket that carries
the phone.
The malicious application tries to read out the International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number of the mobile phone.
If this application is not running in the manufacturer domain,
the application has no right to access this phone specific
information. To overcome this problem we combine it with the
NDEF pairing attack.
Fig. 6: Smart Bluetooth Poster
The NDEF pairing attack is demonstrated with a malicious
smart poster that we call a “Smart Bluetooth Poster”. The setup
is shown in figure 6, it looks like a regular smart poster, but it
has an NFC device attached to the back instead of a working
NDEF tag. An attacker could easily create such a malicious
poster, but an existing commercial poster could be altered as
well. A typical commercial smart poster contains an NDEF tag
that represents a bookmark to the promoted product. It is fairly
simple to break the original tag that is embedded into the poster
with a tool like the rfidzapper [3].
Fig. 7: NFC Phone asked to accept Bluetooth pairing
The NFC device that is attached to the back of the poster
emulates a passive NDEF pairing tag. The user has no knowl-
edge about the NFC device and his phone can not detect the
difference between a genuine tag and our emulated one. If
the user touches the NDEF pairing tag and accepts only one
vague notification shown in figure 7 it starts pairing a Bluetooh
connection. When the pairing is complete the phone disables the
Attack Requires user accept Activates BT Pairs BT Accepts Upload Change Access Rights
Content Sharing no yes no once no
NDEF Pairing once no yes many yes
Combined attack once yes yes many yes
Fig. 5: Practical NFC attacks and their properties
Bluetooth immediately. Luckily we have our Content Sharing
attack to activate the Bluetooth again. The Bluetooth connection
stays active for at least 20 seconds. It requires that the connec-
tion is originated from the MAC address that is embedded into
the NFCIP message. But it does not require an OBEX Push
connection. We were able to use our just paired connection to
access all available Bluetooth services that are provided by the
NFC phone.
One of these services is the proprietary Nokia PC Suite inter-
face. This interface allows the user to backup the phone. Using
the PC Suite interface, we were able to get read and write access
to the complete phone memory. This includes the part where
Nokia stores the access conditions per installed application.
Using the gnokii 9 tool and the information described in the
thesis of Franc¸ois Kooman [15] we were able to alter the access
rights of the application and register it into the manufacturer or
operator domain. The new configuration allowed our application
for example to read out the IMEI number of the phone.
An application running in one of these domains does not
require any confirmation at all, it can for example start au-
tomatically, access the GSM network and personal address
book without the consent of the user. By changing the access
conditions it enables a malicious attacker to spread a virus
through a smart poster. In principle it would be possible to
spread the virus from one NFC phone to another just by
touching. In the manufacturer domain an application has the
rights to control the Bluetooth and NFC interface without user
approval.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The attacks we presented are very practical and a serious
threat for users to get infected by a virus and unwanted spyware
application. Combining the NFC, Bluetooh and proprietary
Nokia features of the Nokia 6212 Classic NFC phone we were
able to upload and install an application into the manufacturer
domain. In this domain the application has no access limitations
and does not need any confirmation from the user to access
advanced features like the GSM network or securely stored
information like the private address book.
We encountered some vulnerabilities in the NFC related
features of the Nokia 6212 phone. The phone should not trust
a pairing that just failed to connect to a headset. The activity
of the NFC interface should be more clear to the user, where it
is connecting to and which access rights an Initiator of NDEF
tag requires. The security risks of following a bookmark may
differ from pairing a Bluetooth connection.
We strongly encourage manufacturers to drop their propri-
etary solutions for NFC pairing and migrate from old fashioned
PIN code pairing to the advanced cryptographic solutions pro-
posed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group [1].
9http://www.gnokii.org
With respect to the responsible disclosure principle we dis-
closed our findings in advance to Nokia. We encouraged Nokia
to look into these problems before releasing a next model NFC
phone.
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